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In this research, we investigate the role of alternative IT innovation strategies (systematic, opportunistic, and non-IT 
innovation) on earnings persistence. Building on agility theory we argue that systematic IT innovation leads to sustainable 
value creation and ability to recover from negative earnings and recession. Using a sample of large US firms we find that 
good (bad) performance of systematic IT innovators is more persistent (transitory) than non-systematic IT innovators, and are 




Systematic IT innovation, sustainable value creation, earnings persistence, agility theory 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With the major industrialized economies already in a recession (Economist 2008), managers are looking for robust strategies 
to navigate their companies through the earnings storm. Guidelines from consulting firms and journalists abound and most of 
them involve suggestions regarding IT strategies (Cummings 2008; McKinsey Quarterly 2008). Understanding what IT 
strategies might work well during a recession or could help a company bounce back from a string of negative earnings is 
critical for managers and investors. This knowledge could be translated into persistent high profitability (earnings) and 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
In economic and accounting literature, earnings persistence represents the ability of firms to preserve their preferential 
competitive position (high earnings) for considerable periods of time (Stigler 1963; Lev 1983). Prior studies have identified 
various economic characteristics such as barriers-to-entry, size, product-type, capital intensity, and R&D that drive earnings 
persistence (Stigler, 1963; Lev, 1983; Baginski et al., 1999; Asthana and Zhang 2006). Approaching this literature from an IT 
perspective, we see two opportunities to make a positive contribution. First, IT spending has been rising and it has become 
the largest capital spending item for most companies (Weill et al. 2002). In spite of this and the recognition of IT enabled 
strategies as a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Sambamurthy et al. 2003; Piccoli and Ives 2005), our search of 
the extant literature shows no evidence of prior research linking IT (resources and capabilities and/or strategy) to earnings 
persistence.  Second, while prior research on earnings persistence has looked at the role of certain economic factors on a 
company's ability to bounce back from a string of negative earnings (Chamber 2006), no attempt has been made to analyze 
and compare earnings persistence between a recession and a recovery period. Hence, the main question of our study is: What 
is the role of IT on earnings persistence and how this differs during a business cycle? 
 
A recent study (Stratopoulos and Lim 2007), has defined IT innovation persistence as a firm’s ability to differentiate itself 
from its peers and stand out in a crowd of competitors through IT innovations over an extended period of time. Approaching 
IT innovation as a zero-sum game, Stratopoulos and Lim (2007) show that IT innovation is a heterogeneously distributed and 
imperfect mobile capability, hence a source of sustainable competitive advantage. They attribute persistence to the path 
dependence of the IT innovation. This means that companies that have been able to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors through IT innovation in the past are more likely to repeat this in the current period. In our study, we argue that 
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IT innovation persistence is linked to earnings persistence, and companies that have developed such an IT innovation 
capability are more likely to deal with recessions and drops in earnings more efficiently than companies that have not 
developed similar capabilities. Our econometric analysis shows that, at least within the group of large US firms in our 
sample, the IT capability leads to not only high profitability (abnormal return on earnings) but also high ability to recover 
from earnings drops and economic downturn, as indicated by the change in their earnings persistence between the good and 
bad financial performance years, or between the recession and recovery periods. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section we review the work on IT business value and IT 
innovation. Thereafter, we discuss the theoretical framework used to govern our discussion and to identify the measures 
considered in this study. The research methodology and the results of an empirical analysis are then presented. Finally, the 
implications for practitioners and researchers are outlined and conclusions and limitations of the study are presented. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Firms today face intense competition in an increasingly turbulent and dynamic global market (D’Aveni 1994; Sambamurthy 
2000). This manifests in higher volatility of earnings, increased incidents of “performance slumps” among Fortune 500 
companies, and stories of companies with superior past performance record having difficulty delivering consistently superior 
earnings in recent years (Hamel and Välikangas 2003). This trend has serious implications for managers and investors since 
earnings persistence (a measure of the company's sustainable competitive advantage) is more desirable than transitory 
earnings (a temporary competitive advantage). In economic and accounting literature earnings persistence has been linked to 
various economic characteristics such as barriers-to-entry, size, product-type, capital intensity, and R&D (Stigler, 1963; Lev, 
1983; Baginski et al., 1999; Asthana and Zhang 2006).  
 
In this study we introduce a company’s approach to IT innovation (IT innovation strategy) as a determinant of earnings 
persistence. In terms of IT innovation strategies firms can be classified as innovative or non-innovative. Among the group of 
IT-innovative firms, a distinction has been made between those that are systematic and those that are opportunistic innovators 
in terms of attributes and their approach to IT innovation strategy (Swanson and Ramiller 1997; Stratopoulos and Lim 2007). 
Systematic IT innovators seem to be taking a long-term and strategic approach to IT innovation. Opportunistic IT innovators, 
on the other hand, will tend to take a short-term approach driven by fashion or fads (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; 
Swanson and Ramiller 1997).1 Using a cross-sectional data set of large US firms from 1997-2004, Stratopoulos and Lim 
(2007) have shown that IT innovation capability is heterogeneously distributed and not easy to imitate, and over an extended 
period of time, it is more likely for systematic IT innovators to continue being systematic innovators than for opportunistic 
and non-IT innovators to become systematic innovators. In the following paragraphs we build on the IT innovation 
persistence of the systematic IT innovators in order to establish the theoretical link between IT innovation strategies and 
earnings persistence. 
Hypotheses Development 
H1: IT Innovation Strategies and Value Creation. 
It is an empirical fact that some firms outperform others and strategy theories try to explain this (Powell 2003). In fact the 
purpose of firm strategies and measure of success is its ability to create value. This occurs when a firm generates earnings, 
which are greater than its cost of capital. Residual income (abnormal ROE) is such a measure of performance that captures 
value creation that has been adopted in accounting (Feltham and Ohlson 1995; Ohlson 2001; Cheng 2005) and strategic 
management literature (Hawawini et al. SMJ 2005). Since the main objective of our study is to consider the effect of IT 
innovation strategies, it makes sense that we should consider a measure of performance that reflects value creation. 
 
Following the suggestion of Kohli and Grover (2008; p. 30) we start by uncovering the capabilities required for value and 
then identify what it takes to build them. Business agility is a critical factor for success in today’s dynamic competitive 
environment (D’Aveni 1994; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Sambamurthy 2000; Sambamurthy et al. 2003). In our study we 
will adopt the following definition for business agility proposed by van Oosterhout et al. (2007: 53-54): 
"Business agility is the ability to sense highly uncertain external and internal changes, and respond to them 
reactively or proactively, based on innovation of the internal operational processes, involving the customer in 
                                                
1 In the rest of our discussion we use the terms systematic/opportunistic IT innovators and systematic/opportunistic IT 
innovation strategy interchangeably. 
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exploration and exploitation activities, while leveraging the capabilities of partners in the business network." (van 
Oosterhout et al. 2007) 
 
This definition captures the three dimensions of agility: customer, partnering, and operational agility. Sambamurthy et al. 
(2003) argue that firms that can bundle these three dimensions of agility are more likely to outperform their competitors by 
launching a higher number and more complex competitive actions. Piccoli and Ives (2005) claim that strategic IS research 
has been “invigorated” by recent studies (Sambamurthy et al. 2003; Weill et al. 2002) that have linked IT with business 
agility. Building on the work of Sambamurthy et al. (2003) and Bharadwaj et al. (1999), we see the following link between 
dimensions of business agility and IT capabilities: 
 
The building of external IT linkages capability refers to connections between the firm and business partners that nurture the 
sharing of knowledge (Konsynski and McFarlan 1990; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994) and prepare the firm to explore IT 
opportunities within the firm as well as with external partners (Feeny and Wilcocks 1998; Bharadwaj et al. 1999). This 
capability is the foundation for the development of customer and partner agility. A company’s operational agility and ability 
to innovate on its internal operational processes will rest on the building of IT business partnerships, i.e., ability to foster 
relationships between IT providers and IT users. IT business partnerships are critical for developing IT innovation (Reich and 
Kaarst-Brown 2003). Finally, a firm’s ability to sense highly uncertain external and internal changes, and respond to them 
reactively or proactively will be related to the Business IT strategic capability. 
 
Swanson and Rasmiller (1997) argue that firms that systematically innovate with IT seem to be more attuned to the 
idiosyncrasies of their internal environment (IT business partnership capability) as well as the external environment (external 
IT linkages), and they tend to promote interactive learning (IT business partnership capability). Such IT-innovative firms are 
also more likely to succeed if senior management perceives IT innovation as an important capability and supports it (IT 
management and IT strategic thinking capability). Therefore companies that have been systematic IT innovators are more 
likely to have these capabilities for developing business agility than opportunistic and non-IT innovators. Thus we develop 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: Systematic IT innovative firms are more positively associated with abnormal ROE than opportunistic and non-
IT innovative firms. 
H2: IT innovation strategies and sustainable value creation 
Value creation that resists the erosion from competitors’ actions is consistent with Porter’s (1985) definition of sustainable 
competitive advantage, and it should be distinguished from occasional spikes in value creation that are associated with a 
temporary competitive advantage. Managers and investors recognize the importance of earnings persistence, a manifestation 
of sustainable value creation (Collins and Kothari, 1989; Barth et al., 1999; Asthana and Zhang 2006). However, earnings 
persistence is differently affected by good news and bad news; good news is defined as positive abnormal ROE, and bad 
news is defined as non-positive abnormal ROE. Prior studies have linked earnings persistence to various economic 
characteristics and have explored their contribution to persistence of good news and transitory bad news (Stigler, 1963; Lev, 
1983; Chamber, 1996; Baginski et al., 1999; Asthana and Zhang 2006). Here we introduce IT innovation strategies as an 
explanatory variable of persistence of positive earnings and transitory negative earnings. 
 
According to Resource Based View (RBV), only resources and capabilities that are valuable, heterogeneously distributed, 
and imperfectly mobile will confer a sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Mata et al. 1995). Stratopoulos and Lim 
(2007) have shown that IT innovation is a path dependent process, and hence not easily replicated. Companies that have been 
able to distinguish themselves from their competitors through IT innovation, and they have been able to repeat this over an 
extended time period (i.e., Systematic IT innovators) are more likely to continue being systematic innovators than for 
opportunistic and non-IT innovators to become systematic innovators. Therefore, systematic IT innovation strategy is more 
likely to lead to sustainable value creation (positive earnings) than non-systematic IT innovation strategies. 
 
In addition, we have seen that systematic IT innovators are more likely to have developed the IT capabilities (IT business 
partnerships, external IT linkage, as well as IT management and IT strategic thinking) needed for business agility. Firms with 
high levels of customer, partnering, and operational agility are better positioned to detect and exploit market opportunities 
(Sambamurthy et al. 2003). Therefore, systematic innovators are more likely and better prepared to respond to negative 
earnings shocks than opportunistic and non-IT innovators. Thus, we conjecture: 
H2a: Systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to have positive persistent abnormal ROE (good news) than 
opportunistic and non- IT innovative firms. 
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H2b: Systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to have less persistent (transitory) negative abnormal ROE (bad 
news) than opportunistic and non- IT innovative firms. 
H3: IT innovation strategies and sustainable value creation during Business Cycles  
An article with the title "How to Think Strategically in a Recession - Strategy for the Recession" was published in Harvard 
Management Update shortly after the 9/11 attacks. The article (Zook and Rigby 2001) suggested that managers should 
consider to what extent their company was prepared to deal with the following scenarios/challenges: Is your company 
prepared to deal with supply chain disruptions?  Will you be able to survive in a price war (prices drop drastically)? Is your 
company prepared for a global recession? While the list is not exhaustive, it certainly captures the main challenges that a 
company is likely to face during a recession. Failure to deal with these challenges would have a detrimental effect on the 
company ability to create and sustain value. 
 
In order to deal with the first of these challenges, companies will need to focus on what Weill et al. (2003) call supply-side 
initiatives (partnering agility) and operational initiatives (operational agility). Leveraging their external IT linkage 
capabilities and business IT partnership capabilities, companies can reach the level of agility that Dell attained in the days 
after the 9/11 attacks.  
“ … Dell, which has built one of the world's best supply chain networks, chartered an airliner to fly parts from 
Taiwan to its Texas factory, ran factories day and night, and converted three 18-wheel trucks into mobile technology and 
support facilities in order to supply 24,000 computers to New York City and Washington, D.C” (Zook and Rigby 2001) 
 
The second and third challenge relate to the following two intertwined patterns that companies are more likely to face during 
an economic recession: First, customers tend to become more price sensitive. Second, companies are more likely to engage in 
price wars (Chou and Chen 2004). During a period of economic expansion, both high- and low-cost producers can be 
profitable. However, during the recession, when prices are falling, only the low-cost producers will be profitable (Zook and 
Rigby 2001). 
“…Intel has cut prices on its microprocessors by 35%. Dell halved its prices and still makes money—not so for 
some of its competitors. The speed of the economy's decline from its high point eighteen months ago will soon underscore the 
importance of relative cost position.”  
 
Companies that have developed what Weill et al. (2003) call demand-side initiatives (customer agility) and operational 
initiatives (operational agility) are more likely to succeed n such an environment of increased price elasticity of customers 
and price wars. Operational initiatives leading to improved cost position will be possible for companies that can leverage 
their business IT partnership capabilities and external IT linkages with partners. The former in order to exploit opportunities 
to reduces inefficiencies in their value chain and identify opportunities to cut cost, and the latter to improve the efficiency of 
their supply chain. However, these operational changes should be done in way that does not sacrifice the service that the 
company offers to its customers. Such customer agility will be feasible for companies that can leverage the external IT 
linkages with customers. 
 
As we have seen, Systematic IT innovators are more likely to have developed the IT capabilities (IT business partnerships 
and external IT linkage) needed for a company to respond to the challenges of an economic recession. Therefore, systematic 
innovators are more likely and better prepared to weather an economic recession than opportunistic and non-IT innovators. 
Therefore we conjecture that: 
H3a: Systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to have persistent abnormal ROE in recovery period than 
opportunistic and non- IT innovative firms. 
H3b: Systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to have less persistent (transitory) abnormal ROE in recession 




To identify firms’ approach to IT innovation within an industry, we followed the methodology used by Stratopoulos and Lim 
(2007). We obtained data from InformationWeek 500 (IW500) from 1997 to 20042.  Conducting a detailed survey of IT 
                                                
2 This period was chosen because it contains the approximate boundaries of a complete cycle in managers’ perception 
regarding innovation with IT (Stratopoulos and Lim 2007).  The period was marked by a sequence of events that one can 
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executives, IW500 publishes an annual list of the largest US companies ranked by their innovative use of IT, business-
technology strategies, and deployment of investments in IT architecture, infrastructure, business, and e-business application. 
The end result is an annual list of IW500 firms that are classified as IT innovators due to their demonstration of a “consistent 
pattern of technological, procedural, and organizational innovation.” (InformationWeek 500 Research Reports – various 
issues 1997-2004).  The publicly available data from IW500 source have been commonly used in a number of studies in the 
past (Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Bharadwaj 200; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996; Lichtenberg 1995; 
Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Stratopoulos and Lim 2007).  
[Insert Table 1] 
Using the listing of IT innovative firms from IW500, the initial step produced 4,000 records of firms (firm-entries) that have 
attained the IT innovator status on any year from 1997-2004. However, among those firms there were 588 entries associated 
with private, non-profit, foreign, or bankrupt firms for which we would not be able to produce financial performance data. 
Eliminating these entries reduced our records to 3,412 corresponding to 1,067 unique firms from IW500. For our second step, 
we used data from Hoover’s Handbook of American Business (Hoovers), which has involved in the preparation of the IW500 
report as a provider of corporate financial data, as well as identified the list of non-IT innovative firms that are also perceived 
to be the top competitors for each of the IT-innovative firms (Stratopoulos and Lim 2007). In fact, we matched the top three 
competitors for each IT innovative firms; specifically, a further manual review was conducted for eliminating 107 
competitors with missing either size or industry value from Hoover’s. The final data contain 960 firms by 622 IT-innovative 
firms from IW500 and 338 non-IT- innovative firms from Hoover’s. 
 
We restrict the sample to include firm-year observations with financial data from Compustat. A cross-match with the Global 
Vantage Key (GVKey) file from Compustat resulted in the elimination of another 26 firms. Thus, 934 unique firms remained 
in our sample, giving us a total of 4,670 firm-year observations for our testing period 2000~2004. Our test requires the initial 
three-year data for the period 1997~1999 to derive the systematic IT innovation data for each firm. We further eliminate 
1,393 firm-year observations of missing current and one-year ahead ROE, and 84 firm-year observations of top and bottom 
one percent extreme values in ROE and abnormal ROE values. This leaves us a total of 3,193 firm-year observations for the 
testing period 2000~2004, representing 712 unique firms (about an average of 639 firms in each year). In our analysis, we 
apply our IT innovation data from the sample period 2000~2004 to forecast one-year lead abnormal ROE for the forecast 
period 2001~2005.    
 
According to National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the technical definition of a recession is that of two 
consecutive quarters of GDP decline; based on this the US economy officially peaked (entered the recession) in March 2001 
with the burst of the dot-com bubble and collapse of NASDAQ. The economy reached its trough (end of recession) in 
November 2001 (NBER 2001, 2003a, 2003b). However, the period from the fall of 2001 till the summer of 2003 was marked 
by several events indicating the economy was not in recovery state yet. First, the stock market and the economy suffered after 
the September 11, 2001 attacks. Second, industries that lost jobs during the recession continued shrinking during the 
recovery. Third, structural changes (due to such factors as outsourcing) in the labour market meant that we were observing 
permanent job losses rather than temporary layoffs. In general, economy wide figures (unemployment statistics) and the stock 
market did not fully recover till the summer of 2003 (Groshen and Potter 2003; NBER 2003b; Wikipedia). In the context of 
our empirical analysis we generate forecasts for 2001 to 2003 (period of recession) and 2004~2005 (period of recovery) 3 
based on sample data from 2000~2002 and 2003~2004 respectively. A total of 1,954 firm-year observations of our sample 
come from 2000-2002 and 1,239 firm-year observations from 2003~2004. 
3.2 Explanatory Variables 
Given the nature of our hypotheses, we identify firms in terms of their approach to IT innovation as Systematic, 
opportunistic, and non-IT innovators. Following a similar yet more conservative approach than Stratopoulos and Lim (2007); 
we create four-year rolling windows (i.e., 1997-2000, 1998-2001,  … 2001-2004), and within each one of these windows, we 
classify a firm as a systematic innovator (SYS=1) if they have been recognized in IW500 more than three consecutive times 
in the four-year rolling window ending with current year.4 Non IT-innovators are firms that have not been recognized in any 
                                                                                                                                                                   
argue has driven this perception: the telecommunications deregulation in 1996, the Y2K problem, the dot com boom, the 
crash of NASDAQ, and 9/11. 
3 The recovery period continued till the fall of 2007. We limit our analysis to the years 2004 and 2005 because we use the 
same sample data set of IT innovators as in Stratopoulos and Lim (2007) and this data set ends in 2004. 
4 We classify a firm as a systematic IT innovator if it has appeared in the list of IW500 in more than two consecutive years in 
a four year rolling window. In other words, we replicated our empirical analysis using the same definition as in Stratopoulos 
and Lim (2007) and our results were the same. 
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of the four years. We classify the rest as opportunistic innovators. Opportunistic innovators are firms that have appeared 
sporadically in IW500; they have not been able to demonstrate a pattern of continuity/persistence of IT innovation in a four-
year rolling window. Based on this classification, our selected sample produced the following results: 536 systematic firm-
year observations (SYS=1); 1,323 opportunistic firm-year observations (OPP=1); and 1,334 non-IT innovative firm-year 
observations (SYS=0 and OPP=0). 
3.3 Measures of Firm Performance 
Following Cheng (2005) and Hawawini et al. (2002), we measure firm performance, firm abnormal ROE (ROEA), which 
equals residual income scaled by book value of equity. Prior research suggests that a firm’s value is determined by current 
book value and the present value of expected future residual income, where residual income is the difference between actual 
income and expected income determined by a firm’s market required cost of equity (Ohlson, 1995).  
Following Cheng (2005), we derive the industry cost of equity from the 48 industry risk premiums documented by Fama and 
French (1997, table 6, page 172~173). The industry cost of equity is the sum of the annualized one-month T-bill yield and the 
Fama and French (1997) industry equity premium. The industry equity premium is estimated from the three-factor model as 
studied in Fama and French (1997). Firms in a same industry shares the same industry cost of capital in the calculation of 
abnormal ROE. To distinguish differential firm abnormal ROE beyond industry average abnormal ROE, we compute the 
industry average abnormal ROE weighted by book value of equity (ROEAIN) and then take the difference between firm 
abnormal ROE and industry average ROE for firm differential abnormal ROE (ROEFM).  
 
We predict that for systematic IT innovative firms, their current positive abnormal ROE is persistent, yet their current 
negative abnormal ROE is transitory. We define an indicator variable (GN) to distinguish positive abnormal ROE (GN=1 if 
ROEA>0) from negative abnormal ROE (GN=0 if ROEA<=0). We also expect systematic IT innovative firms will be more 
likely to recover from losses during recession years (RECESS=1), and more likely to maintain their good performance in 
recovery periods (RECESS=0).  
3.4 Control Variables 
Based upon recent studies of the determinants of IT investments, we control for the effects of known firm-characteristics that 
are associated with firm performance. Previous studies (Lev, 1983; Cheng 2005) find that large firms are more likely to have 
persistent good financial performance relative to small firms and they attribute this to the competitive advantage of large 
firms. We measure firm size (SIZE) as the natural log of total assets. 
 
Second, research and development intensity is viewed as a proxy for a firm’s intangible capital, which may enhance firm 
performance (Li and Wong 2005). We measure R&D (RND) as a firm’s R&D expenditures divided by sales Callen et al. 
2005; Darrough and Rangan 2005; Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1996. Prior studies (Asthana and Zhang 
2006) have found that firms’ and industries’ R&D intensities are both positively correlated with persistence of abnormal 
earnings. 
 
Following prior studies, we also include market share (MS) in our analysis, where MS is defined as the ratio of a firm’s sales 
to the total industry sale. The literature shows mixed findings regarding both the sign and the statistical significance of the 
market share-firm performance relationship (Szymanski et al. 1993). This may be because of the inclusion of some proxy 
variables for power, which may weaken the statistical association between market share and firm performance (e.g., Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson 1996). In addition, firms with high market shares may derive no extra negotiation power benefits, and as a 
result, the efforts devoted to increasing market share (e.g., marketing costs and capacity build-up) may not pay off (e.g., 
Szymanski et al. 1993). Hence, we cannot predict the sign of market share (MS). 
 
Following Cheng (2005), we compute the industry concentration ratio (CR) for each industry formed by 2-digit SIC codes, 
which equals the squared market shared in an industry. Cohen and Levin (1989) find that industry concentration is conversely 
related to industry competitiveness (Cohen and Levin 1989). However, Cheng (2005) argues that a high industry 
concentration represents high barriers to entry and can induce and sustain economic rents by reducing threats from outside 
competition. Thus, we do not have predicted sign for the industry concentration variable (CR).  
3.5 Research Model 
Prior research suggested that the coefficient α1 should be positive in the first-order autoregressive (AR) model, meaning that 
the accounting income of two adjacent fiscal years should be positively correlated (e.g. Lev, 1983, and Kormendi and Lipe, 
1987). Thus next period abnormal ROE is a function of current abnormal ROE: 




ROEAROEA !"# +$+=+ 101  (1) 
where ROEA is the abnormal ROE, t is year subscript. For abbreviation, firm subscript is omitted from all equations. The 
coefficient α1 captures the persistence of current abnormal ROE.  
 
Following Cheng (2005), we decompose current abnormal ROE into industry average abnormal ROE (ROEAINj,t), and firm 
differential ROE (ROEAFMt): 
 ttjt ROEAFMROEAINROEA += ,  (2) 
where j stands for the industry to which each firm belongs. Because industry abnormal ROE varies with industry 
characteristics and firm differential ROE varies with firm characteristics, these two components might have different 
persistence (Cheng 2005). Our research focus is the persistence of firm specific ROE. Therefore, the isolation of firm 
differential ROE from industry average ROE introduces control on industry specific abnormal ROE and enables our tests to 
address how the IT innovation strategy of each firm affects their abnormal ROE performance at the firm level.  
 
From equation 2 and equation 1, we can derive equation 3 as follows: 
tttjt ROEAFMROEAINROEA !""# +$++=+ 1,001  (3) 
where ROEAIN is industry abnormal ROE, computed as weighted (by book value) average firm abnormal ROE within a 
same industry formed by two-digit SIC codes, ROEAFM is firm abnormal ROE computed as the difference between ROEA 
and ROEAIN,  j is industry subscript. Following Cheng (2005), we allow different coefficients for industry ROE (α0) and for 
firm ROE (α1) to reflect their different persistence. We expect both α0  and α1 positive based on the findings of Cheng (2005).  
 
To test our first hypothesis, we add systematic and opportunistic IT innovative variable (SYSt, and OPPt) in the regression to 












where SYSt equals one if a firm has been classified as systematic IT innovator in the four year window (including current year 
t), and zero otherwise; OPPt equals one if the firm has been classified as opportunistic IT innovator in the four year window 
(including current year t), and zero otherwise. Our control variables include SIZE, the natural logarithm of total assets; RND, 
the percentage of R&D investment over sales; MS, the market share, equals the percentage of a firm’s sale over the total sales 
of an industry formed by two-digit SIC code; CR, industry concentration ratio (Herfindahl index), equals the sum of squared 
market shared in the industry.  
 
Our first hypothesis predicts that the abnormal ROE of systematic IT innovative firms is higher relative to opportunistic and 
non-IT innovative firms. So the expected sign of the coefficient α2 of the variable SYSt is positive. While we do not have 
prediction of the coefficient α3 of the variable OPPt, we expect the coefficient α2 > α3.  
 
Our second hypothesis (2a and 2b) predicts different persistence of the abnormal ROE of systematic IT innovative firms 
relative to opportunistic and non-IT innovative firms, conditioning on good/bad news and recession/recovery period. 
Therefore, we introduce the two-way interaction terms of firm abnormal ROE (ROEAFMt) with indicator variable SYSt and 
























Hypothesis two (2a and 2b) requires regressions by good (GN=1) and bad (GN=0) news subsamples, which are 
formed by the sign of ROEAFMt (GN=1 if ROEAFMt>0, otherwise GN=0).  For good news observations, hypothesis 2.a 
predict α4 >0 and α4 > α5. This means that systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to continue their current good 
performance in the next year (have more persistent good performance) relative to opportunistic and non-IT innovative firms.  
For bad news observations, hypothesis 2.b predict that α4 < 0 and α4 < α5. This means that systematic IT innovative firms are 
more likely to turn around their current bad performance in the next year (have more transitory bad performance) relative to 
opportunistic or non-IT innovative firms.  




Note that while according to hypothesis one, the abnormal ROE of systematic IT innovative firms is higher relative to 
opportunistic IT innovative firms and non-IT innovative firms, i.e., α2 > 0, and α2 > α3. However, when grouping firms by 
their current abnormal ROE performance, the good performance of systematic IT innovative firms relative to opportunistic or 
non-IT innovative firms is partially captured by the intercept
0
! .  Specifically, the coefficient estimate of 
0
! in the regression 
of good news sample is greater than the 
0
! in the regression of the bad news sample. In other words, the effect of variable 
SYSt on ROEAt+1 is partly subsumed by the good and bad news sample split.  Therefore, we may not observe the prediction of 
hypothesis one (α2 > 0, and α2 > α3) in the good/bad news regression. 
 
Hypothesis 3a predicts that for the recession period (RECESS=1), the coefficient α4 < 0, and α4 < α5. This means that 
systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to recover from the recession in the next year (have more transitory abnormal 
ROE) relative to opportunistic or non IT innovative firms. Hypothesis 3b predicts that for recovery period (RECESS=0), the 
coefficient α4 > 0, and α4 > α5. This means that systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to continue their good 
performance in the recovery period in the next year (have more persistent abnormal ROE) relative to opportunistic or non IT 
innovative firms. 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown Panel A of Table 2. The current abnormal ROE (ROEAt) has a mean of 0.02, 
which is greater than the close-to-zero mean of one-year ahead abnormal ROE (ROEAt+1). However, their median values are 
the same (0.03). The industry abnormal ROE (ROEAINt) has a mean of 0.03 and the differential firm abnormal ROE 
(ROEAFMt) has a mean of -0.02. The mean systematic IT innovation variable (SYSt) is 0.17, indicating that 17 percent of our 
sample is categorized as systematic IT innovators in the period 2000~2004. The indicator variable of opportunistic IT 
innovators (OPPt) has a mean of 0.41, meaning that 41% of our sample is categorized as opportunistic IT innovators in the 
period 2000-2004. The good news indicator (GN) has a mean of 0.64, suggesting that 64 percent of our observations have 
positive current abnormal ROE. The recession indicator (RECESS) has a mean of 0.61, presenting that 61 percent of our 
sample falls into the recession period. The distribution of all control variables size (SIZE), R&D (RND), market share (MS), 
and industry concentration ratio (CR) have no obvious outliers. Our examination of the standard errors and size of the 
coefficients also shows that they are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the highly correlated variables, indicating 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be problematic (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for all variables in the multivariate model.  While market share (MS) 
and industry concentration (CR) are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.71, none of the correlations between 
the control variables and our key testing variables (the abnormal ROE variables ROEAt and ROEAt+1, the good news indicator 
GN, and the recession indicator RECESS) are above 0.20, and the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) in our regression is 
7.87. To facilitate the interpretation of our coefficients, we take the difference between each control variable (SIZE, RND, 
MS, CR) and its corresponding mean value . So the coefficient of variable ROEAt captures the sample average persistence of 
abnormal ROE. 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
To provide preliminary evidence on our proposed hypotheses, we first calculate average abnormal ROE for the current t and 
next period t+1. If systematic IT innovative firms outperform than non-systematic IT innovative firms (including both the 
opportunistic and non IT innovators), the average abnormal ROE of systematic IT innovative firms should be higher 
compared to non-systematic IT innovative firms. Consistent with our prediction, Panel A of Table 3 shows that systematic IT 
innovative firms have greater abnormal ROE in both current period t and next period t+1, for not only the full sample but 
also subsamples partitioned by good/bad news and recession/recovery periods. All differences are statistically significant at 
less than 5 percent level except for the difference in current ROE of the good news subsample.  This loss of significance for 
the good news subsample is likely to be because the good news partition is based on current abnormal ROE, thus it subsumes 
the positive effect of systematic IT innovation on current abnormal ROE.  
[Insert Table 3] 
We also conduct frequency analysis to reveal how systematic IT innovation affects the autocorrelation between current and 
future abnormal ROE. Specifically, this analysis addresses our research question whether it is more likely for systematic IT 
innovative firms to continue their current good performance in the future, or alternatively, to revert their current bad 
performance in the future. If a firm has two consecutive positive (negative) abnormal ROE in year t and t+1, it is categorized 
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as the ‘consistent’ group; otherwise it is categorized as the ‘inconsistent’ group. Since these results are descriptive in nature 
and do not account for control variables, they only provide preliminary evidence on the relative performance of systematic IT 
innovators versus non-systematic IT innovators.  
 
The Panel B of Table 3 shows that for our full sample, more systematic IT innovative firms (81%) have consistent abnormal 
ROE relative to the non-systematic IT innovative firms (78%). When grouping observations by good/bad news or 
recession/recovery periods, we find that systematic IT innovative firms having good news or in the recovery period are more 
likely to have a persistent abnormal ROE of same signs in two consecutive years. And the Chi-square statistics both the good 
news (4.97) and recovery (3.59) subsamples are significant at 3 and 6 percent level respectively. In contrast, while Chi-square 
statistics are insignificant, systematic IT innovative firms experiencing bad news or in the recession period appear to more 
likely have non-persistent abnormal ROE of different signs in two consecutive years.  
In summary, our univariate result indicates that systematic IT innovative firms are more likely to maintain their current good 
abnormal ROE performance (in recovery period) and flip their current bad abnormal ROE performance (in recession period). 
4.2 Regression Results: Hypothesis One 
We first run a regression of equation 3 as our base model and find that the one-year ahead abnormal ROE (ROEAt+1) is 
positively related to both current industry abnormal ROE (ROEAINt) and current firm differential abnormal ROE 
(ROEAFMt). Table 4 report the regression statistics, the variable ROEAINt has a coefficient of 0.85 and the variable 
ROEAFMt has a coefficient of 0.52, all significant at less than 1% level and comparable to the coefficient reported in Cheng 
(2005, Table 3, page 98). 
 [Insert Table 4] 
We then add the systematic IT innovation indicator variable (SYSt) and the opportunistic IT innovation indicator variable 
(OPPt) in the regression to test our hypothesis one. Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant positive association 
between ROEAt+1 and SYSt for both regressions that with and without control variables (coefficient = 0.03, t-stat = 2.34), and 
the coefficient of SYSt is more positive than the coefficient of OPPt (α2 - α3 =0.04, t-stat=12.07). These findings suggest that 
systematic IT innovators have higher abnormal ROE than opportunistic and non-IT innovators.  We also find that the high 
R&D firms are associated with significantly lower abnormal ROE relative to low R&D firms as indicated by the negative 
coefficient of RNDt (coefficient = -0.10, t-stat = -4.02). The other control variables of size (SIZE), market share (MS) and 
industry concentration ratio (CR) are all insignificant.  
4.3 Regression Results: Hypothesis Two—Good News versus Bad News 
Our hypothesis two predict that the persistence of abnormal ROE for systematic IT innovative firms depends on the level of 
current abnormal ROE: if current abnormal ROE is positive (good news), it is more likely to sustain in the next period; if 
current abnormal ROE is negative (bad news), it is more likely to be transitory and evaporate in the next period.  Therefore, 
to test our hypothesis two, we estimate equation 5 by good and bad news partition of our sample.  
 
However, before splitting sample by good and bad news, with our full sample, we find that the coefficient of SYSt is 
significantly positive (coefficient = 0.03, t-stat = 2.46) and greater than the coefficient of OPPt (α2 - α3 =0.04, t-stat=12.58). 
This means that our hypothesis one still holds after including all the interaction terms between ROEAFMt and our 
independent variables SYSt  and OPPt, and our four control variables. The coefficient of the interaction term ROEAFMt*SYSt 
is insignificantly different from zero (t-stat = -0.67), meaning that before conditioning on the good/bad news and 
recession/recovery, the overall persistence of firm abnormal ROE for the systematic IT innovators is insignificantly different 
from that of the non-IT innovators. However, the coefficient of the interaction term ROEAFMt*OPPt is significantly negative 
(coefficient = -0.13, t-stat = -2.88), suggesting that before conditioning on the good/bad news, the overall persistence of firm 
abnormal ROE for the opportunistic IT innovators is significantly lower than that of the non-IT innovators. Consequently, the 
overall persistence of firm abnormal ROE of the systematic IT innovators is significantly higher than that of the opportunistic 
IT innovators (α4 - α5 = 0.09, t=2.06).  
[Insert Table 5] 
After splitting the sample by good and bad news, consistent with our hypothesis two (2a and 2b), we find that the coefficient 
of the interaction term ROEAFMt*SYSt is significantly positive for the good news subsample (coefficient = 0.14, t-stat = 
2.43), but negative for the bad news subsample (coefficient = -0.35, t-stat = -2.22). This means that systematic IT innovators 
exhibit more persistence good performance (positive abnormal ROE) and more transitory bad performance (negative 
abnormal ROE) relative to non-IT innovators. In the bad news sample regression, we also find evidence that when systematic 
IT innovators are confronted with a bad performance in the current year, they are more likely to turnaround and achieve 
better performance than the opportunistic IT innovators (α4 - α5 = -0.20, t=1.59). However, we did not find significant 
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evidence (in the good news sample regression) that systematic IT innovators have more persistent good performance relative 
to opportunistic IT innovators (α4 - α5 = 0.01, t=0.01).  
4.4 Regression Results: Hypothesis Three—Economic Cycle Effect 
Our hypothesis three (3a and 3b) predict that systematic IT innovators have persistent abnormal ROE in the recovery period 
and less persistent abnormal ROE in the recession period, thus we estimate equation 5 by the recession and recovery period 
partition. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term ROEAFMt*SYSt is significantly 
positive for the recovery subperiod (coefficient = 0.14, t-stat = 2.74), but negative for the recession subperiod (coefficient = -
0.20, t-stat = -2.03). This means that systematic IT innovators have more persistent (transitory) abnormal ROE relative to 
non-IT innovators in recovery (recession) period. In the recovery period regression, we also find evidence that systematic IT 
innovators are more likely to have more persistent abnormal ROE than opportunistic IT innovators (α4 - α5 = 0.16, t=8.03). 
However, we did not find significant evidence (in the recession period regression) that systematic IT innovators have more 
transitory abnormal ROE relative to opportunistic IT innovators (α4 - α5 = -0.07, t=0.49).  
 
To test the joint effect of good/bad news and recovery/recession on the persistence of abnormal ROE of systematic IT 
innovators, we conduct further analysis and estimate equation 5 by four subsamples, namely, good news observations in 
recession period, and bad news observations in recession period, good news observations in recovery period, and bad news 
observations in recovery period. The results of Table 6 reveal that the transitory abnormal ROE associated with systematic IT 
innovators in the recession period, is mainly for the bad news firms. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term 
ROEAFMt*SYSt for the recession and bad news subsample is -0.41 (t-stat = -2.09) and the difference between the coefficient 
estimate ROEAFMt*SYSt and ROEAFMt*OPPt is -0.36 (t-stat = 3.65). We find no significant evidence that the systematic IT 
innovators have more persistent abnormal ROE relative to opportunistic and non-IT innovators in the subsample of recession 
and good news.  
 [Insert Table 6] 
On the other hand, the regression of the good news and recovery period subsample seems perplexing. Although systematic IT 
innovators show more persistent abnormal ROE than non-IT innovators (α4 =0.19, t-stat = 3.69), opposite to our prediction, 
we find that systematic IT innovators have less persistent abnormal ROE relative to opportunistic IT innovators (α4 - α5 = -
0.18, t=8.32). However, these results make sense for the following two reasons: 1. While the recovery period extends till the 
fall of 2007, our forecast period covers only the first two years of recovery (2004-2005). We limited our analysis to the years 
2004-2005 because we use the same sample data set of IT innovators as in Stratopoulos and Lim (2007) and this data set ends 
in 2004. 2. In absolute levels, the systematic IT innovators significantly outperform the opportunistic IT innovators by 2% in 
firm differential abnormal ROE in the good news recovery sample (SYS - OPP = 0.02, t = 3.6). Since it is more difficult to 
maintain high growth in abnormal ROE because competition will drive away high abnormal ROE (Cheng, 2005), this may 
contribute to lower persistence of the abnormal ROE of systematic IT innovators relative to that of the opportunistic IT 
innovators. 
 
Collectively, our findings largely support our three hypotheses, suggesting that systematic IT innovators have higher 
abnormal ROE, and more persistence (transitory) good (bad) performance relative to opportunistic and non-IT innovators. 
Moreover, the persistence of abnormal ROE of systematic IT innovators is higher (lower) than that of opportunistic and non-
IT innovators in more regular recovery period (chaotic recession period). 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary & Implications 
Overall, our findings suggest that systematic IT innovation strategy leads to value creation and this value creation resists the 
erosion from competitors’ actions. Based on our sample of large US firms, systematic IT innovators enjoy higher abnormal 
ROE than opportunistic and non-IT innovators, and overall persistence of firm abnormal ROE of the systematic IT innovators 
is significantly higher than that of the opportunistic IT innovators. During a recession, when systematic IT innovators are 
confronted with a bad performance in the current year, they are more likely to turnaround and achieve better performance 
than opportunistic IT innovators. 
 
Based on the evidence from the recession of the early 2000s, we conclude that companies that had adopted a systematic 
approach to IT innovation have demonstrated remarkable business agility. They are better prepared to deal with economic 
recessions and the turbulence of a modern hypercompetitive environment. Our findings complement prior evidence that has 
shown that successful companies tend to press their advantage (invest) during recession as a preparation for recovery (Dobbs 
et al. 2002). 




The study has several implications. First, we have introduced a new economic characteristic (IT innovation strategy) in the 
literature of drivers of earnings persistence. Analysts and investors interested in selecting companies with long-term potential 
(earnings persistence) may want to consider the company’s IT innovation strategy in their evaluation. Second, we evaluated 
the role of IT innovation strategy during the recent business cycle, as well as in the context of good news and bad news. This 
prepares a path for more future research on the role of IT innovation strategies in the context of the current global economic 
crisis. Third, although the results indicate that systematic IT innovation leads to improved firm earning persistence, the 
underlying mechanisms for developing a successful systematic IT innovation strategy require further investigation. Fourth, 
with budget cuts on center stage of IT agendas, forward looking managers are exploring ways to use IT in order to cut costs 
in a way that will help them leap ahead of weakened competitors  (Kaplan, Roberts, and Sikes 2008; Kaplan and Sikes 2008; 
McGee and Soats 2008). To these managers, the message of our study is that a long-term systematic approach to IT 
innovation is better than trying to follow the most recent technological trend or new killer application.  
5.2 Limitations 
Our main source, IW500 does not provide the complete list of firms that were considered as IT innovative but which were 
subsequently rejected. In other words, we have access to a truncated sample of only the firms that have attained IT innovation 
status.5 As mentioned in the description of the data set, we tried to mitigate this limitation by leveraging IS and management 
literature as well as the guidelines followed by IW500. We looked at the top competitors and we used the same source 
(Hoover’s) that was used by IW500 for the compilation of their data set. We limited the number of competitors to a maximum 
of three in order to ensure that only companies that could have been included in the IW500 pool of candidates were included 
in our control group. 
 
Another limitation that warrants mention is the selection of the control groups. We use top three competitors from Hoover’s, 
which was actively involved in the completion of IW500. Despite attempts to match the control sample based on industry 
type and firm size, for some of firms in IT innovative sample, an appropriate control firm of similar size, but could be also IT 
innovative firms in a different time period. In addition, our lack of knowledge about the IT capability of the control sample 
precludes any direct comparison of the two groups on the nature and quality of their IT resources. 
Finally, for our analysis we have used the same sample data set period (2000-2004) as in Stratopoulos and Lim (2007) and 
this limits our ability to forecast in the recovery period to the years 2004 and 2005. According to the NBER the recovery 
period lasted until the end of 2007. 
5.3 Future Research  
Although the results indicate that IT innovation persistence leads to improve firm’s earning persistence, the underlying 
mechanisms through which this can be achieved further. Factors such as IT intensity, current state of IT, and several new 
areas of IT innovation could play a critical role in determining the success of IT innovation persistence. Perceptions 
regarding the number of associated agents, such as customers, suppliers, or intermediates, the capabilities of their IT 
expertise, or the type of arrangements could also influence earning persistence. Examining such additional factors might be a 
fruitful research endeavour in the future.  
 
The period of analysis offers another opportunity for future expansion of our work. Our analysis in based on the recession in 
the early 2000s, which was more localized in nature (mostly US) and it was driven in part by the 9/11 events. Future studies 
will have to replicate this with data from the current crisis which is global in nature and driven by the financial crisis. 
5.4 Conclusion 
While, IT innovation may not be suitable and feasible for all firms, companies that have developed a systematic approach to 
IT innovation are better prepared to deal with the modern hypercompetitive environment. Systematic IT innovation strategy 
leads to the creation of sustainable value creation. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variables  Definition 
ROEAt+1 DV One-year ahead abnormal ROE 
ROEAt IV Net income (#237)t/Book value of equity (#60)t-1 - cost of equityt* 
ROEAINj,t IV Industry average abnormal ROE weighted by book value of equity. 
ROEAFMt IV Firm differentiated abnormal ROE, i.e. ROEA minus ROEAIN. 
SYSt IV 1 if a firm has a systematic IT innovation strategy; otherwise 0. 
OPPt IV 1 if a firm has an opportunistic IT innovation strategy; otherwise 0. 
GNt IV 1 if a ROEA>0 and zero otherwise 
RECESSt IV 1 for the testing period 2000~2002, and zero for 2003~2004 
SIZEt CV Natural logarithm of total assets (#6). 
RNDt CV Research & Development Expenditure: (#46) / Net Sales (#12) 
MSt CV Market share: Net Sales (#12) / ∑(Net Sales (#12) over the industry 
CRt CV 
Industry concentration ratio (Herfindahl index): Sum of squared market shared in 
the industry 
t  Year subscript, from 2000 to 2004. 
j  Industry subscript, identified by Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification. 
 
*We derive the industry cost of equity derived from the 48 industry risk premiums documented by Fama and French (1997, 
table 6, page 172~173). The industry cost of equity is the sum of the annualized one-month T-bill yield and the Fama and 
French (1997) industry equity premium. The industry equity premium is estimated from the three-factor model as studied in 
Fama and French (1997). Firms in a same industry shares the same industry cost of equity in the calculation of firm abnormal 
ROE.   
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Table 1: Sample Selection (1997-2004) 
 
 
Step 1: InformationWeek 500 (IW500) 
Firm-records based on initial InformationWeek 500 sample from 1997-04 (Firm-Year)  4,000 
Firm-records eliminated because we would not be able to produce financial data (entries associated with private, 
nonprofit, foreign, bankrupt, etc. firms. 
(588) 
Firm-records eliminated because parent firm appeared more than once in a year (survey was done by collecting 
data at the business unit level) 
(17) 
Firm-records associated with publicly traded firms 3,395 
  
Unique firms among the firm-records (IT Innovative firms) 1,067 
 
Step 2: Hoover’s 




IT innovative firms (IW500 and Hoover’s) 622 
Non-IT innovative direct competitors added - controlled for size (revenue) and industry structure (SIC 
classification). 
338 
Selected Firms – 622 IT innovative and 338 non-innovative firms 960 
 
Step 3: COMPUSTAT data availability 
Firms eliminated because they have no COMPUSTAT matching (26) 
Unique firms remained in the sample 
Number of firm-year observations for the testing period 2000~2004 (Initial three-year observations from 1997 to 





Firm-year observations eliminated due to missing current and one-year ahead abnormal ROE data (2000~2004)   
(1393) 
Firm-year observations eliminated top and bottom 1% current and one-year ahead ROE and abnormal ROE data   
(84) 
Firm-year observations remained in the selected sample (2000~2004)  
 
Systematic IT innovative firm-year observations  
Opportunistic IT innovative firm-year observations  
Non-IT innovative firm-year observations 
 
Recession period innovative firm-year observations 









Final Data Set – Unique Firms (2000~2004) 712 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Variables Mean Std. MIN P25 Median P75 MAX 
ROEAt+1 0.00 0.24 -4.99 -0.05 0.03 0.09 1.27 
ROEAt 0.02 0.21 -1.96 -0.04 0.03 0.10 1.47 
ROEAINj,t 0.03 0.08 -0.74 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.59 
ROEAFMt -0.02 0.19 -1.84 -0.07 0.00 0.05 1.22 
SYSt 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
OPPt 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GNt 0.64 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
RECESSt 0.61 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZEt 8.83 1.74 1.03 7.71 8.70 9.87 14.23 
RNDt 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 7.55 
MSt 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.17 1.00 
CRt 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.20 1.00 
 
The descriptive statistics on all variables are based on the full sample of 3,193 firm-year observations in the period 2000-
2004. See Appendix 1 for variable measurement. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (Continued)  
 
Panel B: Correlations between Variables 
 
















































































































































































*** <1% significant level; ** <5% significant level; * <10% significant level 
 
The correlation triangle reports Spearman correlations between variables using a full sample of 3,193 firm-year observations in the period 2000-2004. See 
Appendix 1 for variable measurement. 
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Table 3: Two by Two Mean and Frequency Analysis 
 
 All Firm-Years 
Good News  
Firm-Years 






Panel A: Mean Analysis 
Mean ROEAt ROEAt+1 ROEAt ROEAt+1 ROEAt ROEAt+1 ROEAt ROEAt+1 ROEAt ROEAt+1 
           
Sys=0  0.01 0.00 0.11 0.07 -0.15 -0.13 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.06 
Sys=1 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.09 -0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.08 
           
Sys=1 minus Sys=0 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 
t-stat 3.46 5.24 0.68 2.16 2.5 4.17 1.93 3.75 2.05 2.09 
p-value 0.0006 0.05 0.497 0.0314 0.0128 <.0001 0.0541 0.0002 0.0412 0.0369 
 












           
Sys=0: No. of Obs. 2082 575 1334 326 748 249 1275 401 807 174 
% of Row Obs. 78.36% 21.64% 80.36% 19.64% 75.03% 24.97% 76.07% 23.93% 82.26% 17.74% 
Sys=1: No. of Obs. 434 102 315 54 119 48 209 69 225 33 
% of Row Obs. 80.97% 19.03% 85.37% 14.63% 71.26% 28.74% 75.18% 24.82% 87.21% 12.79% 
           
Chisq. 1.82  4.97  1.07  0.10  3.59  
Prob. 0.18  0.03  0.3013  0.7467  0.0581  
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Table 4 Regression Analysis: Hypothesis 1  
 
  Pred. Sign 
Equation 3 
 
Equation 4  
(No Controls) 
Equation 4  
(With Controls) 
   Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept   -0.02*** -4.5 -0.02*** -3.35 -0.02*** -2.92 
ROEAIN  + 0.85*** 18.95 0.86*** 19.03 0.85*** 18.94 
ROEAFM  + 0.52*** 26.65 0.51*** 26.4 0.50*** 25.28 
SYS H1 +   0.03*** 2.66 0.03** 2.34 
OPP    ?   -0.01 -0.93 -0.01 -1.45 
SIZE  CV     0.00 1.53 
MS  CV     0.04 1.18 
CR  CV     -0.03 -0.72 
RND  CV     -0.10*** -4.02 
         
Coefficient test (one-tail): 
SYS-OPP=0 H1 +   0.04*** 11.25 0.04*** 12.07 
Adj. R2 (%)   24.85  25.07  25.49  
Obs.    3193  3193  3193  
 
*** <1% significant level; ** <5% significant level; * <10% significant level. All significant levels are based on two-tail tests except for the tests noted 
otherwise as one-tail.  
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   Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
intercept   -0.02*** -3.57 -0.01* -1.73 -0.07*** -4.18 -0.04*** -4.49 0.02*** 2.55 
ROEAIN  + 0.89*** 19.74 0.95*** 23.78 0.54*** 4.84 0.82*** 12.45 0.75*** 15.3 
ROEAFM  + 0.56*** 16.13 0.59*** 16.01 0.34*** 4.34 0.54*** 10.36 0.58*** 17.24 
SYS H1 + 0.03*** 2.46 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.34 0.03* 1.73 0.01 0.9 
ROEAFM*SYS H2/3 +/- -0.04 -0.67 0.14** 2.43 -0.35** -2.22 -0.20** -2.03 0.14*** 2.74 
OPP   ? -0.01 -1.38 -0.02*** -2.77 -0.04* -1.92 -0.02 -1.32 0.01 0.66 
ROEAFM*OPP  ? -0.13*** -2.88 0.13** 2.43 -0.16* -1.73 -0.13** -2.13 -0.01 -0.3 
SIZE  CV 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.41 0.00 -0.32 
ROEAFM*SIZE   -0.02 -1.43 -0.01 -0.56 -0.03 -1.21 -0.02 -1.05 -0.01 -0.82 
MS  CV 0.03 0.98 0.01 0.49 -0.09 -0.98 0.06 1.14 -0.01 -0.39 
ROEAFM*MS   0.39** 2.11 0.65*** 2.94 -0.47 -1.16 0.03 0.13 1.24*** 6.44 
CR  CV -0.04 -0.95 -0.03 -0.8 0.05 0.53 -0.04 -0.67 0.01 0.15 
ROEAFM*CR   -0.11 -0.57 -0.27 -0.93 0.14 0.39 -0.33 -1.15 0.47** 2.37 
RND  CV -0.45*** -6.92 -0.12 -1.56 -0.63*** -5.36 -0.63*** -7.17 0.03 0.41 
ROEAFM*RND   -0.52*** -5.88 -0.10 -0.15 -0.70*** -4.56 -0.74*** -6.4 0.26 0.87 
             
Coefficients Test (one-tail):             
SYS-OPP=0 H1 + 0.04*** 12.58 0.02*** 5.95 0.05** 2.85 0.05*** 7.51 0.00 0.1 
ROEAFM*SYS 
-ROEAFM*OPP=0 H2/3 +/- 0.09* 2.06 0.01 0.01 -0.20* 1.59 -0.07 0.49 0.16*** 8.03 
Adj. R2 (%)   26.54  35.39  8.84  21.12  47.12  
Obs.   3139  2029  1164  1954  1239  
 
*** <1% significant level; ** <5% significant level; * <10% significant level. All significant levels in tables of this paper are based on two-tail tests except for 
the tests noted otherwise as one-tail.  
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   Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
intercept   -0.04*** -3.99 -0.10*** -4.85 0.02*** 3.16 0.02 0.88 
ROEAIN  + 0.96*** 15.29 0.41*** 2.87 0.85*** 19.51 0.45*** 2.89 
ROEAFM  + 0.78*** 11.81 0.22** 2.28 0.47*** 13.69 0.58*** 5.51 
SYS H1 + -0.01 -0.54 0.02 0.51 0.01 0.98 -0.02 -0.56 
ROEAFM*SYS H2/3 +/- 0.06 0.50 -0.41* -2.09 0.19*** 3.69 0.00 0 
OPP   ? -0.02 -1.45 -0.03 -1.06 -0.01 -1.15 -0.05 -1.52 
ROEAFM*OPP  ? -0.08 -0.91 -0.04 -0.38 0.37*** 6.34 -0.20 -1.51 
SIZE  CV 0.00 -0.10 0.01 1.13 0.00 0.49 -0.02*** -2.46 
ROEAFM*SIZE   0.03 1.13 -0.03 -1.05 -0.04*** -2.64 -0.13*** -2.6 
MS  CV 0.02 0.34 -0.16 -1.33 0.02 0.9 0.40*** 2.89 
ROEAFM*MS   0.73* 1.82 -1.28*** -2.58 0.38* 1.73 3.97*** 6.2 
CR  CV -0.01 -0.22 0.09 0.7 -0.04 -1.34 -0.02 -0.16 
ROEAFM*CR   -0.59 -1.08 0.09 0.2 0.41 1.42 -0.14 -0.28 
RND  CV -0.34*** -2.71 -0.73*** -5.33 0.03 0.35 0.23 0.99 
ROEAFM*RND   0.68 0.71 -0.83*** -4.63 -1.31* -1.76 1.11* 1.77 
           
Coefficients Test (one-tail):           
SYS-OPP=0 H1 + 0.01 0.24 0.05  1.52 0.02** 3.6 0.02 0.39 
ROEAFM*SYS 
-ROEAFM*OPP=0 H2/3 +/- 0.14 1.36 -0.36**  3.65 -0.18*** 8.32 0.20 0.81 
Adj. R2 (%)   27.96  9.24  54.30  24.09  
Obs.   1117  837  912  327  
*** <1% significant level; ** <5% significant level; * <10% significant level. All significant levels in tables of this paper are based on two-tail tests except for 
the tests noted otherwise as one-tail.  
